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The Industrial Investment Policy of the SUA 
1. Introduction 
In its Annual Report fur 1977-78 the SUA reveals that it had £17million 
invested in twenty-six companies. This modest level of investment 
represents its contribution over its first five years of activity 
towards attaining its rather ambitious goals: Ho help in uplifting 
and regenerating Scottish industry and the Scottish economy_, and in 
improving the total stock and quality of Scotland's industry in terms 
of equipment_, products and management1' (SDA 1978b). With only some 
£120mil1 ion to invest over a five-year period, the contribution of the 
SDA to the achievement of these objectives can be little more than 
marginal. It has been suggested that to make any significant impact 
on the problems of Scottish industry the SDA needs to be given 
substantially more funds for investment. Does the Agency's perform-
ance suggest that a far larger investment budget could be justified? 
Of course it is far too early to be able to provide any empirical 
assessment of the impact of the SDA's investments. However, it is now 
possible to form some idea of the role that the SDA sees itself playing 
and this poses certain questions. Considerable emphasis has been 
placed on the need to ensure the commercial viability and long-run 
profitability of the Agency's investments. This stress on market 
tests is somewhat paradoxical as the case for the SDA is based on the 
argument that private institutions and market forces have failed to 
solve the problems of the Scottish economy. The objectives of the 
Agency have still to be clearly defined and consequently its investment 
criteria lack clarity, and without more precisely stated objectives and 
criteria it is difficult to see how the Agency can be made accountable 
for its expenditure. 
2. Statutory Obligations and the Guidelines 
When the Agency was established in 1975 the objectives for its industrial 
investment function were defined \/ery broadly: 
i:
 (a) furthering economic development, 
(b) the provision., maintenance, or safeguarding of employment;, 
(c) the promotion of industrial efficiency and international 
competitiveness. " (SDA Act, 1975) 
It was left to the Secretary of State for Scotland to attempt to give 
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of Financial Institutions (Wilson Committee). The primary criteria 
adopted by the Agency are (i) Profitability; (ii) Management; (iii) 
Employment; botn direct and indirect through multiplier effects; and the 
technological impact. 
(i) Profitability 
Considerable emphasis is placed by the Agency in its public pronouncements 
on the profitability and commercial viability of the concerns in which 
it intends to invest. the Agency had interpreted its profitability 
goal as implying "that there must be a commercially acceptable prospect 
of an appropriate level of profit, and thus of return on investment, 
within a reasonable period of time". (SDA 197^  a ) But this does 
not imply that the SDA is determined to compete on the same terms as 
other financial institutions. It is pointed out that "the Agency is 
prepared to exercise patience and to refrain from requiring an 
immediate return on its money" (ibid). Of course this could be 
interpreted as implying that the Agency is looking for the same 
discounted rate of return as the market, but is prepared to wait longer 
for the benefits of the investment to materialise. But the oral 
evidence to the Wilson Committee suggests that this is not the case, 
and it appears that little significance is attached to DCF evaluation. 
The SDA's Finance Director, Mr R P McEwan, explained why the DCF 
evaluation might be inappropriate "in quite a number of instances we 
could invest equity in a company which in year I and year 2 could be 
showing absolutely negative return, but we would not do so unless by 
years 3,4, or 5 we saw something above average. In fact in terms of 
a DCF calculation we might get the wrong answer, and we would look to 
yields with some confidence because in year I and 2 we could see 
ourselves as assisting these companies to reach the targets". (SDA 
1978 a. But in such a case a DCF evaluation would establish whether 
or not the positive cash flows expected in later years provide 
adequate compensation for the negative cash flows of the earlier years. 
If the profitability criterion implied nothing other than a commercially 
acceptable accounting rate of return in the long run, it suggests: 
(a) that an inappropriate criterion is being employed 
for purposes of resource allocation, 
(b) an element of subsidy is concealed in any short-run 
relaxation of the long-run target. 
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hl1SL9+[!erally a?reed that the rate of return on capital employed 
has no theoretical basis as a criterion for the appraisal of 
investments. More appropriate is the DCF rate of return which takes 
L c S f f " l e n2v n °^ C ° ' t S and benefits ^to account. Unfortunately. 
no statutory obligation is imposed on the Agency to evaluate 
investments on a discounted basis. This is in contrast to the 
requirement imposed on the National Enterprise Board to employ the 
public sector test rate of discount for appraising investments 
The DCF rate of return does appear in the SDA's checklist for the 
evaluation of investment proposals but appears to play a subordinate 
role to the profitability test in the Agency's decisions. If the 
Agency used the DCF rate of return to appraise investments a role 
would remain for the profitability test: carefully interpreted it is 
usefully employed as an ex post control mechanism to maintain financial 
discipline. 
The SDA makes great efforts to stress that it is only interested in 
investing in commercially viable concerns: ''long run -profitability 
is an essential of sound business and. a necessary and salutary 
discipline on management ... the Agency will hold firm, to a viability 
testj both because it is required to do so and because it sees this 
as essential to its purposes in fostering sound development • (SDA 1977^  
but even if the Agency is not prepared to subsidise failing firms on a 
continuing basis; and few would disagree with this policy, this does 
not imply that it should not be prepared to supply finance on a 
subsidised basis to viable concerns as a means of achieving its 
objectives. 
If the SDA is to provide some finance on softer terms than the market, 
and there are likely to be somewhat limited demands placed on it if it 
is content to try to fill gaps in the capital market and offer finance 
on strictly commercial terms, the subsidy should be made explicit and 
related to the non-financial objectives being pursued. The subsidy 
needs to be made explicit for effective decision-taking in the Agency, 
and so that, an adequate basis for maintaining accountability can be 
developed. The subsidy implicitly offered by the Agency being 
'prepared to exercise patience and refrain from requiring an immediate 
return on its money'1 is quite possibly not the most effective way of 
buying the co-operation of private firms in pursuing employment and 
other non-profit objectives. In principle, the Agency seeking to 
allocate its limited resources to greatest effect,would be prepared to 
trade off the DCF rate of return against non-finacial objectives in a 
more flexible manner. 
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Commercial viability and profitability a.e understandably stressed by 
the SOA for political purposes. Financial discipline and the efficient 
use of resources are readily associated with profitability while 
subsidies are normally seen as evidence of inefficiency and failure, 
Moreover, the SDA purporting to seek a commercial rate of return on its 
investments'defines an acceptable role for the Agency in relation to 
the private sector. If the SDA explicitly recognises it can offer 
finance on soft terms it implies it has an unfair advantage over 
other financial institutions, and it requires their co-operation for 
its effective functioning. Also if firms are financed by the SDA on 
a subsidised basis it provides them with a possible cost advantage 
over their competitors in the product markets, and the Guidelines 
quite explicitly state that -companies controlled or financed by the 
Agency are not to be given an unfair competitive advantage whether 
through the availability of public funds or other means'"' (Guidelines 
1576). 
(ii) Management Quality 
Management quality is presented by the Agency as a separate and "an 
entirely indispensable criterion" (SDA 1977) for the evaluation of 
investment proposals. At the analytical level the quality of Manage-
ment, without at all denying its significance, can be readily subsumed 
into the profitability criterion. It appears the Agency is so intent 
upon stating its commitment to the well-managed and efficient firm 
rather than the lame ducks associated with the hiEB and Government 
rescue operations, that it is prepared to sacrifice analytical clarity 
in the development of its criteria. 
(iii) Employment 
The most important non-financial criterion is the consequence of the 
investment proposals for long-run employment prospects. The Agency 
purports to take the secondary effects on employment into account in 
addition to the direct effects: 
'•The Agency will take into account in evaluating any proposition 
its potential for generating or enhancing activity and employment 
in other (normally supplier) companies in Scotland'' (SDA 1970a) 
The Agency normally seeks to minimise the possible conflict between 
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the goals of profitability and employment contending that sound 
commercial investments are the best means of securing long-term 
employment prospects. When it does recognise the difficulties of 
always reconciling the efficiency and employment criteria the Agency 
comes firmly down on the side of efficiency: 
"The Agency is clear that because of its proper concern with the 
longer term, it must stand on the side of efficiency and 
modernisationt and it is convinced that the pursuit of these 
and the enhanced level of economic activity to which they give 
rise, must be the proper path towards dependable and continuing 
job creating- (SDA 1973b) 
But (1) increasing employment opportunities is the key to greater 
prosperity in Scotland and the reduction of above average levels of 
unemployment and net migration, (2) there is an inevitable conflict 
between these objectives in the Agency's overall strategy if not in 
some individual investments, a conflict which will only disappear 
when the problems of the Scottish economy have been solved. To keep 
the Agency's role in proper perspective far more emphasis needs to be 
given to the employment objective. It might be more appropriate for 
the Agency's investment policy to be redefined as the maximisation of 
long-run employment opportunities subject to a budgetary constraint. 
There is some scope for dealing with the conflict between profitabilty 
and employment criteria through the USP nf cost benefit analysis which 
by recognising the relatively low real cost of employing labour would 
favour the expansion of employment opportunities. 
(iv) Technological Impact 
In addition to profitability and employment criteria the Agency also 
purports to take the technological nature of proposals into account 
Those proposals which lead to the •enhancement of the general technical 
level of Scottish industry justify the Agency's attention and support-
(SDA 1978a). Such investments generate social benefits that will not 
be taken into account by firms, ana there is consequently a tendency 
to under-investnient in such projects in the private sector, 
Some element of subsidy may be justified to increase the level of such 
investments, and the SDA by providing finance on softer terms than the 
market can help achieve this goal. Some explicit relaxation of the 
tests of commercial acceptability would appear to be appropriate 
4. Investment Policies 
The Agency has drawn a distinction between reactive investments, those 
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investments made in response to initiatives taken by others, and those 
investments undertaken as a result of its own initiatives. So far 
almost all of its investments are of a reactive character but the Agency 
anticipates that it will soon be in a position to start implementing its 
own investment policy. It is argued below that the scope for the 
Agency developing an effective investment policy while employing 
commercial criteria is quite limited. 
In its evidence to the Wilson Committee (SDA 197 ) the Agency claims 
that it has identified a clear need for its services. It is argueu 
that while the demands for short-term borrowing are well served by the 
clearing banks it has some role to play in the provision of longer 
term loans. But its primary role is seen to be in the provision of 
equity capital to small and medium-sized firms. Its analysis of 
the functioning of the capital market suggests: 
(a) it is responding to national (British) problems at the 
regional (Scottish) level rather than dealing with the 
particular problems of the Scottish economy 
(b) there is no evidence to indicate that the low level of 
growth and investment in Scotland can be traced to any 
weakness in the provision of finance 
(c) it is doubtful whether the gaps in the capital market that 
it seeks to fill will provide many opportunities for invest-
ments expected to yield commercial rates of return. 
The Agency's analysis of 'need' for equity concentrates on factors 
affecting the UK economy as a whole: 
(a) high rates of inflation which have increased the working capital 
requirements of firms> 
(b) high interest rates which make firms reluctant to borrow; 
(c) high rates of gearing which have made it impossible for firms 
to borrow; 
(d) high rates of personal taxation which have made it difficult 
for the proprietors of firms to retain enough capital for 
expansion, 
(e) the non-allowability of personal overdraft interest as a tax-
deductable expense which has pushed up the cost of capital 
for smaller firms; 
(f) the impact of the capital transfer tax which has made the 
inheritance of business difficult. (SDA 197ba) 
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It is the alleged failure of the capital market to fill these needs 
that has allowed the SDA to develop its reactive investment role. 
The gaps in the capital market identified by the SDA tend to be of a 
national character but an attempt is made to argue that the effects of 
these gaps are particularly onerous in Scotland. 
The SDA sep<; a major role for itself in filling the 'equity gap' for 
the smaller non-quoted company. The Scottish Clearing Banks in their 
evidence to the Wilson Committee point out that equity finance is 
already made available to such companies by bodies such as ICFC, FFI 
and Technical Development Capital Limited. But according to the SDA 
these bodies do not operate effectively in Scotland and there is a 
specifically Scottish need for the services it can provide. In its 
evidence to the Wilson Committee the Agency contended that as ICFC 
"is based in London this must limit the extent to which decision-
making is devolved to the Scottish offices, and will, at least interpose 
some delay in handling cases'' (SDA 1978a). In the oral evidence it 
was suggested that ICFC had not made much impact on Scotland, But 
this could be a reflection on the lack of suitable investment opportunities 
being generated in Scotland. The Bolton Committee while recognising the 
existence of a gap considered that the regional differences in the 
financial facilities available to small firms were marginal. Even the 
existence of a gap which is worth filling is open to question It 
might be argued that no institutions have developed to fill the gap as 
there is no scope for profitable investment in this area. Information 
and transactions costs are relatively high and this has tended to inhibit 
the development of a market. The absence of a market for the shares of 
non-quoted companies is going to pose problems for the SDA as it attempts 
to implement a disinvestment policy to allow it to recycle its funds. 
The SDA contends that the private institutions leave another gap in the 
capital market as they are not prepared to take action to remove manage-
ment deficiencies even when this constitutes the only barrier to profit-
able investment. It is suggested that "lack of confidence in manage-
ment is for most institutions a conclusive bar" (SDA 1978a). When 
the Agency is presented with such proposals it will consider the 
possibility of resolving management weaknesses: 
•'The Agency can provide company management with some short-term 
assistance and support in particular or specialised spheres but 
it does not aim to have the capability of providing major 
operational management resources for long periods of time- (SDA 1973a) 
In the oral evidence to the Wilson Committee it was pointed out that the 
strengthening of management is a factor in more than half the SDA1s 
investments. 
If the management weaknesses can be eliminated by a limited short-term 
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input by the Agency, why have the private institutions not developed 
the necessary expertise to fulfil this function and increase the range 
of their business? It is quite possible that some institutions have 
felt inhibited in developing such an explicit proprietorial role, but 
this is hardly the case for all institutions. It is far more likely 
that the institutions appreciate the difficulties associated with 
proqrammes of management change or improvement. Difficulties to 
wnicn the bUA may be more sensitive following its failure to get the 
management of Triadynamics to respond to its prodding. And there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that conglomerates have not found it 
easy to improve the efficiency of their constituent companies. If 
management weaknesses are a significant factor in accounting for the 
poor performance of Scottish industry, and this is a widely held view 
(see the West Central Scotland Plan 1975), it is difficult to see how 
the Agency can improve matters while seeking a commercial rate of 
return on its investments. 
The Agency also believes that it has a role in the promotion of indig-
enous firms. This has been explained by the Agency's chief executive: 
"There are strong arguments for encouraging the further develop-
ment of -indigenous industry and an increase in the -proportion of 
Scottish-based companies. The arguments are not chauvinistic 
or political but rest in the fact that the existence of a greater 
number of decision-making centres in Scotland will encourage and 
hold men of talent, and strengthen the total Scottish management 
pool. The Agency will therefore do all it can to assist and 
support developments that will enhance the indigenous proportion 
of Scottish industry3 recognising that this must be a process 
extending over many years"'' (Robertson 1973) 
There is some evidence to suggest that the birth rate of new enterprises 
in West Central Scotland has been relatively low (Firn 1973) Without 
discussing the factors responsible for these findings, or the desirability 
of this policy, it may be argued that the Agency will be unable to make 
any real contribution without subsidising the birth process of new 
enterprises and the relaxation of its commercial tests. 
The Agency is likely to find that it tends to be approached by firms 
that have failed to obtain finance from private investors. Its 
analysis of the gaps in the capital market generating investment 
proposals promising commercial rates of return is not very convincing. 
If the equity investments and loans extended by the SDA could be 
expected to satisfy normal commercial criteria there would appear to 
be no real need to supplement existing market institutions. But this 
does not mean there is no role for the SDA to play. Many investments 
may not offer the prospect of commercial rates of return but neverthe-
less constitute worthwhile investments from a social standpoint, 
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The Agency is now considering a more positive investment role in which 
it will be taking the initiative and not merely responding to the 
requests of firms for finance. Firms will be encouraged to develop 
in ways that are beneficial to the Scottish economy. Without 
considering in detail the character or merits of such initiatives it 
quickly becomes clear that there is little prospect of the SDA obtain-
ing a commercial rate of return on such investments. The company 
investments in the various growth sectors that the SDA might wish to 
develop in Scotland might well be profitable but the return on the SDA's 
investment is likely to be below that expected by the market. If the 
SDA is to induce firms to undertake their development in Scotland some 
inducement is necessary. The SDA finance may be "'aae available on 
condition that firms are prepared to develop at certain locations and at 
a certain time and must consequently be offered at a lower cost than 
that of the market to be acceptable to firms. Other investments might 
be favoured by the SDA because of their high linkage or multiplier 
effects. These external benefits are not taken into account by 
individual firms and they will only be prepared to invest if the 
inducement is made sufficiently attractive. 
One way in which the Agency's objectives and criteria could be clarified, 
while at the same time allowing its executives independence in the 
exercise of commercial judgement, would be to use cost benefit analysis 
as the basis of the investment policy. The case for the use of cost 
benefit analysis has been well argued by a member of the SDA board 
(Alexander 1975). Heuelieves the theoretical limitations and data 
difficulties associated witn cost benefit analysis have been exaggerated 
and that one of the major barriers to its more extensive use is the 
reluctance of decision-makers to see their decision-taking powers 
constrained. -Managers and politicians now enjoying the freedom of 
decision-making in the absence of a calculus of costs and benefits 
can3 within limits,, indulge in their own preferences for regions, for 
votesj for prestige, and so on. The curtailment of such freedom will 
be resisted. It is not surprising that the most far-reaching applic-
ations of cost benefit analysis take place where there is an extraneous 
party who makes aid for a given purpose conditional upon its costs and 
benefits satisfying rigorous scrutiny.' Cost benefit analysis would 
allow the identification of socially desirable investments and provide 
a systematic basis for resolving the conflict between the Agency's 
efficiency and employment objectives. 
5. Accountabilty 
In quasi non-governmental institutions such as the SDA there is 
inevitably conflict between the claims of independence and effective 
operation and accountability. While those para-governmental agencies 
in the UK associated with industrial development have to a large extent 
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been modelled on the Italian IRI it is essential we avoid the lack of 
accountability attained by that body; 
''The IRI experience could be swnmarised as that of an industrial 
state within a state within a state;, almost free of government 
interference3 wholly unaccountable to any democratic body,..' 
(Corti 1976) 
In formal terms the Agency is accountable to Parliament through its 
sponsoring ministry, the Scottish Office. The accounts of the SDA 
are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General and he reports to 
the Public Accounts Committee. A good working relationship between 
the C & AG and the SDA, while not enough to ensure an adequate degree 
of accountability, will be of considerable assistance in Parliament in 
its endeavours to make the SDA accountable. How this relationship 
is developing should become clearer with the publication of the 
proceedings of a recent session of the PAC concerned with the 
activities of the SDA. 
The NEB, which is in a somewhat different position to the SDA as its 
accounts are not audited by the C & AG, has fiercely argued that 
detailed surveillance of its activities would impair its commercial 
effectiveness (Public Accounts Committee 1977-78) It would, it is 
suggested, injure relationships with client companies, as transactions 
would no longer be confidential, and lead to a loss of efficiency in 
the NEB as its executives became less prepared to take initiatives that 
would be open to scrutiny by a Parliamentary Committee The NEB 
contends that its performance should be assessed over a period of time 
against its statutory obligations. 
The Report of the Expenditure Committee on Public Money in the Private 
Sector'1 suggested that Parliament had two basic duties in relation to 
public expenditure: 
(1) to insist that objectives were clearly stated 
(2) expenditure be monitored to ensure that value for money was 
being obtained in pursuing these objectives 
(Expenditure Committee 1971-72). The more precise the objectives the 
greater the degree of accountability that may be achieved. As the 
objectives of the SDA are ill-defined,and its criteria purport to be 
based on commercial standards that are not relevant for the role it 
is expected to play, it is going to be difficult to exercise effective 
control over its operations. Another factor that is going to make it 
difficult to evaluate the SDA's performance is the tendency for it to 
invest its capital alongside other government money provided under 
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the Industry Act: 
"The great majority of the cases we handle involve also Industry 
Act money and selective financial assistance, and therefore will 
to a greater or lesser extent, be discussed with the Scottish 
Economic Planning Department1' (SDA 1978a) 
This inevitably leads to a diffusion of responsibility and a loss of 
accountability. 
6. Conclusion 
If the SDA has a role to play, and this question has not been 
explicitly considered here, it has been suggested that it should 
not be shaped primarily by commercial considerations. Social 
objectives, particularly the generation of employment opportunities, 
need to be stressed and it is unreasonable to expect the SDA to 
purse these objectives and earn a commercial rate of return on its 
investments. On the whole the SDA must work through the provision 
of finance on relatively soft terms to induce companies to undertake 
those investments and policies that it believes to be in the social 
interest. These companies, and even most of the capital expenditures 
that they are encouraged to undertake, may be commercially viable 
but the SDA cannot be expected to earn market rates of return on its 
outlays if it is to make a significant contribution to the solution 
of Scotland's industrial problems. 
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